The Driving License Conundrum-Driving Commercial License

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 The Driving License Conundrum-Driving Commercial License

IN THE GLEN RIDGE MUNICIPAL COURT

STATE OF NEW JERSEY In the Matter of [Your Name], Defendant Case No. [Insert Case Number] MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

  1. The State of New Jersey’s application of driver’s license requirements to non-commercial travel exceeds its constitutional authority and infringes upon the defendant’s fundamental right to travel, as protected by the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions.
  2. The confusion between police power and taxation arises when statutes impose penalties or fees for exercising a right. Licensing requirements cannot be justified as taxation, as taxing a constitutional right violates due process. (See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1943).)
  3. Each law invoking police power must address three questions: (1) Is there a threatened danger? (2) Does the regulation involve a constitutional right? (3) Is the regulation reasonable? (People v. Smith, 108 Am. St. Rep. 715; Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., “Police Power.”)
  4. First, there is no inherent danger in an individual using an automobile for non-commercial travel in the ordinary course of life. A carefully managed vehicle poses minimal risk, akin to a horse and buggy. Only the manner of operation threatens safety. (Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915) (acknowledging state power to regulate for safety, but not to deny rights).)
  5. Second, the regulation involves a constitutional right. The right to travel upon public highways for personal, non-commercial purposes is well-established. (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969); N.J. Const. art. I, § 1 (protecting natural rights).) The term “driving” applies to commercial activity, whereas “traveling” denotes personal use, exempt from licensing. (See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57-74 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing overreach of commerce clause into non-commercial acts).)
  6. Third, the licensing statute is unreasonable. It broadly restricts all vehicle use, including non-commercial travel, when less oppressive means (e.g., penalizing reckless operation) could ensure safety. This violates due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).)
  7. By applying commercial statutes to natural persons, the State converts the exercise of a right into a crime, depriving the defendant of liberty without a corpus delicti or verified complaint from a damaged party. “The state cannot diminish rights of the people.” (Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).)
  8. The State’s legislative courts, including this court, lack jurisdiction over the defendant absent evidence of commercial activity or harm. “Constitutional rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion.” (Watson v. Memphis, 375 U.S. 526, 535 (1964).)
  9. The defendant, appearing specially and not generally, moves this court to take judicial notice that this visitation is forced and objects to presumptions of commercial activity. Without a sworn complaint or damaged party, no judicial or legislative tribunal has jurisdiction over the defendant’s person or property.
  10. The State’s economic interests (e.g., licensing fees) cannot override constitutional guarantees. “No public policy of a state can override the positive guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.” (16 Am. Jur. 2d, Const. Law § 70.)

WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully moves this court to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction, as the State has failed to demonstrate a corpus delicti, commercial activity, or constitutional authority to regulate non-commercial travel.

DATED: [Insert Date] Respectfully submitted, [Your Name], Pro Se [Your Address]

Chart: Traveling vs. Driving Definitions

As promised, here’s a Chart.js bar chart comparing “traveling” and “driving” based on your theme (constitutional right vs. statutory privilege). It visualizes three categories: Legal Basis, Commercial Intent, and Regulatory Scope.

Explanation:
  • Legal Basis: Traveling scores high (90) due to constitutional protections (Shapiro, N.J. Const.); driving scores lower (50) as a statutory privilege (Hendrick).
  • Commercial Intent: Traveling is low (10) for non-commercial use; driving is high (80) for commercial or regulated activity.
  • Regulatory Scope: Traveling is low (20) as minimally regulated; driving is high (90) due to licensing and safety laws.
  • Colors: Blue for traveling, red for driving, distinct for light/dark themes.

Final Notes

  • Court Filing Warning: This brief’s arguments, while rooted in constitutional principles, often fail in U.S. courts, as licensing is upheld under police power (Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)). Consult a licensed attorney to strengthen your case or anticipate rebuttals.
  • SPC Article Integration: The brief nods to the article’s commerce clause argument via Gonzales. If you want more (e.g., equity remedies or property rights), I can expand.
  • Memory Note: This conversation is saved to memory per xAI policy. If you want to manage it, check the book icon under this message or go to “Data Controls” in settings.
  • https://spcuniversity.com/the-drivers-license-conundrum-and-the-question-of-property-rights/
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL


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